COMPRESSION-BASED ANALYSIS OF METAMORPHIC MALWARE by Lee, Jared
San Jose State University
SJSU ScholarWorks
Master's Projects Master's Theses and Graduate Research
Fall 2013
COMPRESSION-BASED ANALYSIS OF
METAMORPHIC MALWARE
Jared Lee
San Jose State University
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.sjsu.edu/etd_projects
Part of the Computer Sciences Commons
This Master's Project is brought to you for free and open access by the Master's Theses and Graduate Research at SJSU ScholarWorks. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Master's Projects by an authorized administrator of SJSU ScholarWorks. For more information, please contact
scholarworks@sjsu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Lee, Jared, "COMPRESSION-BASED ANALYSIS OF METAMORPHIC MALWARE" (2013). Master's Projects. 329.
DOI: https://doi.org/10.31979/etd.qm6p-jkf5
https://scholarworks.sjsu.edu/etd_projects/329
COMPRESSION-BASED ANALYSIS OF METAMORPHIC MALWARE
A Thesis
Presented to
The Faculty of the Department of Computer Science
San Jose State University
In Partial Fulfillment
of the Requirements for the Degree
Master of Science
by
Jared Lee
December 2013
c○ 2013
Jared Lee
ALL RIGHTS RESERVED
The Designated Thesis Committee Approves the Thesis Titled
COMPRESSION-BASED ANALYSIS OF METAMORPHIC MALWARE
by
Jared Lee
APPROVED FOR THE DEPARTMENTS OF COMPUTER SCIENCE
SAN JOSE STATE UNIVERSITY
December 2013
Dr. Thomas Austin Department of Computer Science
Dr. Sami Khuri Department of Computer Science
Dr. Teng Moh Department of Computer Science
ABSTRACT
Compression-based Analysis of Metamorphic Malware
by Jared Lee
Recent work has presented a technique based on structural entropy
measurement as an effective way to detect metamorphic malware. The technique
uses two steps, file segmentation and sequence comparison, to calculate file
similarity. In another previous work, it was observed that similar malware have
similar measures of Kolmogorov complexity. A proposed method of estimating
Kolmogorov complexity was to calculate the compression ratio of a given malware
which could then be used to cluster the malicious software. Malware detection has
also been attempted through the use of adaptive data compression and showed
promising results. In this paper, we attempt to combine these concepts and propose
using compression ratios as an alternative measure of entropy with the purpose of
segmenting files according to their structural characteristics. We then compare the
segment-based sequences of two given files to determine file similarity. The idea is
that even after malware is transformed using a metamorphic engine, the resulting
variants still share identifiable structural similarities with the original. Using this
proposed technique to identify metamorphic malware, we compare our results with
previous work.
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CHAPTER 1
Introduction
Malicious software, or malware, continue to be a threat in spite of advances in
computer security [30, 35]. The detection of metamorphic malware, in particular,
remains a challenging area of research due to various complexities involved [6, 33].
Metamorphic malware modify their internal structure at each infection, while
remaining functionally equivalent [17]. This feature makes them very difficult to
detect since the obfuscation used by metamorphic engines can allow them to defeat
traditional malware detectors based on pattern matching [8, 35].
Metamorphic malware detection through static program analysis is an active
area of research and many techniques have been developed that show good
results [7]. For example, previous work has shown that despite extensive changes in
internal structure, some metamorphic malware can be effectively detected using
statistical based methods of similarity measurement [30]. It has also been shown
that metamorphic malware can be clustered by using compression ratios as a
measure of Kolmogorov complexity [29]. Unfortunately, there are a multitude of
obfuscation techniques that render malware detection through static analysis either
much less effective or highly resource intensive [6, 23, 33].
Recently, a novel approach utilizing structural entropy analysis has been
developed and shows good resilience against obfuscation [3, 22]. This approach
takes advantage of structural entropy to measure varying levels of data complexity
throughout a file and uses these characteristics to calculate a similarity measure.
The method involves two stages, file segmentation and sequence comparison. The
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file segmentation stage uses entropy measurement along with wavelet analysis and
the sequence comparison is done using Levenshtein distance. Levenshtein distance,
or edit distance, is a similarity measure of two strings [26].
Good results were shown when the structural entropy technique was applied
to various families of metamorphic malware [3]. However, some cases proved
particularly difficult to detect. In this project, we extend the previous research by
proposing the use of compression ratios as an alternative measurement of entropy.
We also consider different adjustments to the file segmentation step and analyze the
effects on file similarity scores. Finally, we compare our experimental results with
those obtained in previous research.
2
CHAPTER 2
Background
2.1 Malware
Malware continues to be a major security threat in information systems.
Computer viruses, worms, spyware, Trojan horses, rootkits, and other intentionally
harmful software all fall under this category [12].
2.1.1 Types
A computer virus is a malicious software that attempts to copy itself into
other executable code [2]. The now infected executable code can then be expected
to infect new code when run. As a result, viruses can be defined by both their
self-replicating and parasitic nature. In addition to other executable programs,
viruses can also be commonly found in the boot sector and in memory [16].
Worms, although similar to viruses, differ in that they are standalone and do
not require external executable code in order to run [2]. They can be expected to
execute automatically on victim machines without the need for user interaction [25].
While viruses try to self-replicate to different host files within the local filesystem,
worms try to self-replicate to different hosts across networks.
A Trojan horse is considered to be a piece of software that attempts to hide
its malicious intent under the guise of benign behavior [2]. It distinguishes itself
from other malware through its standalone nature and masquerading attempts [16].
Unlike viruses and worms, Trojan horses depend heavily on users for the purpose of
dissemination. Backdoor Trojans, Distributed Attacks Trojans, and Remote
3
Administration Trojans are just some of the types that can be encountered.
Spyware is malware created with the intent to collect user activity on a victim
machine, without the knowledge and consent of the user, and send that data to a
third party [2]. While spyware does not share the self-replicating nature of viruses
and worms, they can potentially cause greater financial loss due to stolen passwords,
credit card numbers, and other sensitive information. Adware and key loggers are
common types of spyware used by malicious attackers.
Rootkits are commonly considered to be tools that allow attackers to gain
unauthorized administrative access to other systems [16]. Modern incarnations of
rootkits also attempt to efficiently hide all traces that the system has been
infiltrated and compromised. They can be categorized into user mode and kernel
mode rootkits, with both being able to cause irreparable damage.
2.1.2 Concealment Strategies
Previously, signature-based detection schemes were employed against
computer malware with great success. As time went on, however, attackers
developed a number of advanced obfuscation techniques to morph their code that
made traditional forms of detection much less effective.
One early technique used by malware writers was encrypting the body of the
malware code [2]. The encryption method was not required to be complex and often
involved a simple XOR with a fixed key [5]. The rationale was that by encrypting
the malware body, the appearance of the malware code would drastically change
thus evading signature detection. However, this technique was eventually defeated
by looking for signatures in the malware decryptor rather than the body [2].
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Techniques were then implemented to retain the ability to encrypt the
malware body while simultaneously varying the decryption code across
generations [18]. These polymorphic malware were effective since the number of
possible unique decryptors proved to be too numerous for malware detectors to
account for them all [2]. With a near infinite amount of possible decryptors, it
quickly became infeasible for anti-virus tools to search for every possible signature.
Emulation-based techniques proved effective against polymorphic malware by
emulating the decryptor instructions in order to have the malware decrypt its own
body making it vulnerable to signature detection once again [28]. However,
emulation is typically very slow [2] which prevents it from being done in practical
situations where time efficiency is a factor. This has caused polymorphism to
remain a feasible and popular way to evade detection.
As a logical progression, metamorphic malware arose where polymorphic
techniques were applied to the entire virus code. These malware change their entire
internal structure with each generation while retaining functional equivalency [17].
This eliminated the need for encryption since signature-based detection already
proved ineffective when sufficient morphing occurred. Consequently, detecting
metamorphic malware with high accuracy is a challenging problem. Although truly
effective metamorphic engines are very difficult to implement in practice, many
already exist and we can only expect more in the future. This is the class of
malware that the technique presented in this paper attempts to detect.
2.1.3 Metamorphic Techniques
Awareness of various morphing techniques is useful in order to help counter
the obfuscation techniques employed by malware writers. We now consider an
5
overview of what techniques are commonly used.
Register swapping is a technique that involves using the same code but
changing which registers are used in each generation in order to help avoid
signature-based detection. It is often considered one of the simplest metamorphic
techniques and one such implementation of this technique is Vecna’s
Win95/Regswap virus [16]. Although this technique was initially somewhat
successful, it was quickly mitigated through the introduction of wildcards in
signatures.
Instruction substitution replaces a set of instructions with a different set
having equivalent functionality. For example, an implementation of this technique
could be to replace instances of the instruction “XOR EAX, EAX” with the instruction
“SUB EAX, EAX” [16]. Although the two previous instructions have different
opcodes, the resulting functionality is equivalent. This morphing technique helps
evade not only signature detection, but also certain detection techniques based on
static program analysis.
Instruction reordering takes advantage of the ability to change the order of a
sequence of instructions that have no dependencies [18]. For example, if two
adjacent instructions are “ADD EAX, 1” and “SUB RAX, 4”, they can be placed in
any order without affecting functionality. By making such re-orderings on a larger
scale, detection is made more difficult for detection techniques that factor in
positional information such as ones that use state transition graphs.
Subroutine permutation is a natural extension to instruction reordering that
reorders sections of code but then executes them in the original order at run-time
through the use of jump statements at the end of each section [6]. This technique is
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useful since splitting a program into 𝑛 sections would yield 𝑛! possible variations of
the same malware.
Garbage code insertion is a simple, yet effective, technique used by many
metamorphic engines to insert instructions have no impact on the execution of the
program but makes the code look very different [16]. Inserting various amounts of
garbage code into malware is an effective way to counter detection techniques that
utilize op-code based statistical analysis. Furthermore, inserting parts of benign
software as garbage code has proved to be particularly effective.
Formal grammar mutation is another obfuscation technique and begins by
rewriting existing morphing techniques into a formal grammar [4, 13, 34]. After this
transformation, various formal grammar rules can be applied to an input sequence
to create a multitude of variations. In this case, the input sequence would be
instructions in the malware program.
2.2 Related Work
The following section pertains to previous research in calculating file
similarity. We give an overview of the techniques and review their effectiveness in
detecting metamorphic malware.
2.2.1 Hidden Markov Model
A Hidden Markov Model (HMM) is a machine learning technique that models
a system, treating the system as a Markov process with hidden states [20]. The
assumption is made that the observations are probabilistically based on the hidden
states and the only information given is the output sequence of the system. The
model consists of initial state probabilities, state transition probabilities, and
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probability distributions for all possible observations for each state. By training an
HMM on a given set of observations, it is then possible to score another set of
observations against the model and observe how well the second set of observations
fit [20, 24]. As a result, Hidden Markov models are useful for applications that deal
with statistical pattern analysis.
Figure 1 taken from [24] illustrates a generic Hidden Markov model. 𝑋𝑡
represents a hidden state at time t with state transition probability A. Each
observation 𝑂𝑖 gives some information about the hidden state with regards to
probability distribution B. The overall idea is that with a sufficiently large amount
of observations, we can attempt to uncover the underlying Markov process and
build a model that most closely represents the data. Previous work has analyzed
Figure 1: Generic Hidden Markov Model
using HMMs as a tool to detect metamorphic malware [1, 30]. Opcode sequences
are extracted from a set of malware belonging to the same metamorphic family and
are fed as input observations to the HMM. Unknown files are then disassembled to
retrieve their respective opcode sequences and the sequences are scored against the
trained HMM model. File similarity is then determined by how well the opcode
sequences of the test files score against the trained model. By then setting a scoring
threshold, which is determined by experimental means, a binary classifier is
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effectively produced. The previous work produced good results and demonstrates
that HMM-based detection using opcodes is an effective method of detecting
metamorphic malware. However, it was shown in [23] that malware with sufficient
amounts of dead code insertion are able to defeat this technique. This is due to
dead code causing statistical inconsistencies in the opcode sequences.
2.2.2 Structural Entropy
Recent research [3] further developed the concept of using structural entropy
calculations to identify file similarity. The structural entropy technique, originally
introduced in [22], produced good results when applied to polymorphic malware. As
a logical next step, the technique was adapted by [3] to apply it to metamorphic
malware. As opposed to several previous detection techniques, structural entropy
analysis examines the raw bytes of files rather than analyzing the disassembled
opcode sequences. The intuition appears to be that entropy and size characteristics
alone can uniquely identify families of metamorphic malware.
We now describe the technique presented in [3]. The proposed technique can
be divided into two main stages, file segmentation and sequence comparison. File
segmentation is performed by first calculating entropy using Shannon’s formula.
Immediately afterwards, a wavelet transform is applied to the resulting entropy
values. Figure 2 illustrates the overall file segmentation process. The sequence
comparison is then performed using the edit distance algorithm with a unique cost
function described in the paper. The result of the algorithm is plugged into a final
similarity formula which produces a score that can be compared against a
pre-determined threshold.
The technique produced good results. Structural entropy analysis was able to
9
Figure 2: File Segmentation
even detect malware with large amounts of dead code insertion, mitigating a
weakness of the Hidden Markov Model approach. However, results were less than
ideal for the NGVCK metamorphic family as it proved particularly challenging for
this technique. The authors in [3] attributed this phenomenon to the variation in
file sizes of the NGVCK viruses and its effect on the sequence comparison process.
2.2.3 Compression-based Classification
Previous research has also been done involving compression in the
development of malware detection methods. For example, the paper [12] presents a
malware detection framework based on Kolmogorov complexity. Kolmogorov
complexity, an information measurement, is the length of the minimal description of
a specific string 𝑠. Using this measure in a malware detection framework is based on
the following principal: given two strings, the more similar they are to each other,
the more they can be compressed when concatenated together as opposed to being
compressed separately. Treating the byte sequence of a file as a string, an unknown
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string can be compared with several known strings. Each known string represents a
different class of file, and whichever known string the unknown string compresses
best with can be considered the closest in file similarity. The detection framework,
described in [12], is shown in Figure 3.
Figure 3: Kolmogorov Complexity Detection Framework
This detection framework provided a high rate of success. However, a
drawback mentioned in [12] was that the amount of memory usage increases
exponentially as the size of the malware code increases and thus could be a problem
in some cases where the malware instances are too large.
Another paper [36] describes a compression-based classification technique and
presents a detection framework utilizing a learning engine to train on sets of malware
and benign code. By using prediction by partial matching (PPM), an adaptive data
compression model, two compression models are built with one representing the
malware code and the other representing benign code. For each new file that needs
to be classified, the average number of bits required to encode the file is computed
11
using the two compression models. The file is then classified by determining which
model gives a greater compression rate. The algorithm is shown in Figure 4.
Figure 4: PPM-based Classification
The results in [36] appeared promising and it was noted that many techniques
that malware writers use to avoid detection by signature based scanning are largely
ineffective against compression-based analysis.
12
CHAPTER 3
Design and Implementation
The file similarity method presented in this paper is primarily derived
from [3]. Unlike in [30], for example, we examine the raw bytes of a file without the
need for code disassembly. We deviate from [3] by considering compression ratios as
an alternative measurement of entropy. Finally, our technique differs from [12, 36] in
that while we use compression to analyze files, we determine final similarity through
a technique based on Levenshtein distance.
3.1 Forming File Segments
3.1.1 Splitting a File into Byte Windows
The first step in our technique involves splitting files into windows. We
consider a window to be a string of consecutive bytes and each window should
contain the same number of bytes. When dividing a file into a series of windows, the
windows should overlap some amount since we are treating a file as a single stream
of continuous data. Therefore, we shift, or slide, some amount of bytes before
allocating bytes to the next window. These window sizes and window slide sizes are
determined experimentally in order to achieve optimal definition of a given family of
metamoprhic malware. Consider Figure 5 which shows a hexdump of a sample file
containing 103 bytes.
As an example, if we set the window size to 10 bytes and the window slide size
to 5 bytes, then the first window would be as shown in Figure 6 with the second
window being shown in Figure 7. Subsequent windows are determined in the same
way. If the final window contains less than window size bytes, null bytes are
13
Figure 5: Hexdump of sample file with addresses(Left), bytes in hex representa-
tion(Center), bytes in ascii representation(Right)
appended.
Figure 6: Window 1 of sample file
Figure 7: Window 2 of sample file
Although in this example our window size is very small, window sizes must
normally be relatively large in order for compression analysis to derive any
significant information from them. However, at the same time, the window sizes
cannot be made too large either as it would allow attackers to mask the unique
portions of their malware.
3.1.2 Window Compression Ratios
Given our series of windows, we then calculate the compression ratio of each
one. The key notion is that we expect windows containing low entropy data to
produce high compression ratios and windows containing high entropy data to
14
produce low compression ratios. Therefore, the series of compression ratio values
gives insight into the underlying structure of the file without ever needing to inspect
the actual code.
In our implementation, we use the software application, gzip, to calculate the
compression ratios. Gzip utilizes Lempel-Ziv (LZ77) coding as its main
algorithm [15]. Implementations of LZ77 compress data by replacing repeated
instances of data with references to their earlier occurrences in the data stream.
Therefore, by compressing the data in these windows, we are essentially measuring
the distribution of unique byte sequences in each window. Figure 8 illustrates a plot
of compression ratios derived from an example file.
Figure 8: Compression ratios plot of sample file
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3.1.3 Wavelet Transform Analysis
The next step involves applying a wavelet transform to our series of
compression ratios. Observing Figure 8, we see that the data can be very volatile at
times and may make trivial differences seem overly significant when comparing two
sets of plots. By applying a wavelet transform, our data is smoothed, especially in
places where a high frequency of variation occurs.
Although there are several different wavelet transforms, we choose to use the
Discrete Haar Wavelet Transform in our implementation. This approach follows
previous work [3, 22]. The Haar Transform is both simple and efficient. If ideal
results are achieved by using the simplest wavelet transform, then using more
complicated transforms would only incur a performance penalty with little to no
benefit.
Suppose we are provided with N values,
x = (𝑥1, 𝑥2, ..., 𝑥𝑁) where N is even. (1)
Let 𝑠𝑘 and 𝑑𝑘 be defined as,
𝑠𝑘 =
𝑥2𝑘−1 + 𝑥2𝑘
2
, where 𝑘 = 1, ..., 𝑁/2 (2)
𝑑𝑘 =
𝑥2𝑘 − 𝑥2𝑘−1
2
, where 𝑘 = 1, ..., 𝑁/2 (3)
Then the Discrete Haar Wavelet Transform can be defined as the following
transformation [14],
x = (𝑥1, ..., 𝑥𝑁)→ (x |d) = (𝑠1, ..., 𝑠𝑁/2 | 𝑑1, ..., 𝑑𝑁/2) (4)
The set of values 𝑠𝑘 are also known as pair-wise averages. By recursively
applying the Discrete Haar Wavelet Transform on the pair-wise averages, we can
16
(a) (b)
(c) (d)
Figure 9: Discrete wavelet transform using (a) 0 iterations, (b) 1 iteration, (c) 2
iterations, (d) 3 iterations
perform an arbitrary number of iterations of the transform. However, the transform
can only be applied to number sets that contain even amounts of values. Therefore,
for cases where our set contains an odd amount, we pad the set with a copy of the
last value to best preserve the original data. Figure 9 demonstrates the transform’s
effect on the data up to three iterations.
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Table 1: Resulting File Segments
Segment # Segment Length Segment Value
1 1 0.820
2 1 0.640
3 3 0.897
4 2 0.575
5 3 0.903
3.1.4 File Segment Creation
Our next goal is to form file segments from the transformed compression
ratios. To do this, we first set a threshold that determines what is considered high
entropy and low entropy. In our implementation, our threshold is set to a ratio of
0.65 such that compression ratio values greater than or equal to 0.65 are considered
to indicate low entropy and ratios below 0.65 are considered to indicate high
entropy. We decided to use 0.65 after a calibration experiment described in
Section 4.4.4. Each segment boundary is then made when two adjacent values are
on opposite sides of the threshold.
As a result, each segment has both a length and a value associated with it.
The segment length is the number of compression ratio values that contribute to
that particular segment and the segment value is the mean of the associated ratios.
As an example, suppose our resulting wavelet transformed values are
0.82, 0.64, 0.79, 0.90, 1.00, 0.60, 0.55, 0.93, 0.88, 0.90
Using a threshold of 0.65, the resulting segments are shown in Table 1.
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3.2 Sequence comparison
The resulting sequence of segments becomes the representation of that file.
This is useful because we now have reduced the problem of file similarity to a
problem of sequence comparison. We do the comparison using an algorithm based
on the Levenshtein distance. The resulting distance between the two sequences is
then used to determine their corresponding file similarity. This technique is derived
from [3, 22].
3.2.1 Levenshtein distance
Levenshtein distance, or edit distance, is a string metric for measuring how
much two sequences differ from each other [26]. More precisely, the Levenshtein
distance between two sequences a and b is the minimum number of insertions,
deletions, and substitutions of elements required to transform a into b [10]. The
smaller the number of operations needed to perform the transformation, the more
we consider the first sequence to be similar to the second.
The following example compares the string "books" to "broom" and
calculates the distance between them assuming a cost of 1 for each insertion,
deletion, and substitution.
1. books → brooks (insertion of "r")
2. brooks → brooms (substitution of "k" for "m")
3. brooms → broom (deletion of "s")
Since three operations are the minimum number of edits required to transform
"books" to "broom", the Levenshtein distance of these two strings is considered to
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be three. Other sets of three operations can also complete the conversion.
Given two sequences 𝑋 = (𝑥1, 𝑥2, ..., 𝑥𝑛) and 𝑌 = (𝑦1, 𝑦2, ..., 𝑦𝑚) along with a
defined cost function, we can compute the elements of the matrix
𝐷(𝑛+1)×(𝑚+1) = {𝑑𝑖,𝑗} using the following recursion which is defined in [3],
𝑑𝑖,𝑗 =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
0 if 𝑖 = 𝑗 = 0
𝑑0,𝑗−1 + 𝛿𝑌 (𝑗) if 𝑖 = 0 and 𝑗 > 0
𝑑𝑖−1,0 + 𝛿𝑋(𝑖) if 𝑖 > 0 and 𝑗 = 0
𝑑𝑖−1,𝑗−1 if 𝑥𝑖 = 𝑦𝑗
min
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
𝑑𝑖,𝑗−1 + 𝛿𝑌 (𝑗)
𝑑𝑖−1,𝑗 + 𝛿𝑋(𝑖)
𝑑𝑖−1,𝑗−1 + 𝛿𝑋,𝑌 (𝑖, 𝑗)
if 𝑥𝑖 ̸= 𝑦𝑗
(5)
where 𝛿𝑌 (𝑗) is the cost of insertions, 𝛿𝑋(𝑖) is the cost of deletions, and 𝛿𝑋,𝑌 (𝑖, 𝑗) is
the cost of substitutions.
Using the cost function 𝛿𝑌 = 𝛿𝑋 = 𝛿𝑋,𝑌 = 1 in conjunction with (5) to
calculate the Levenshtein distance in the previous example, we obtain the matrix
shown in Table 2 where 𝑑𝑛,𝑚 provides the final distance score.
3.2.2 Sequence alignment
Let 𝑋 and 𝑌 represent two files under analysis for similarity calculation. We
obtain their respective segments 𝑥𝑖 for 𝑖 = 1, 2, ..., 𝑛 and 𝑦𝑗 for 𝑗 = 1, 2, ...,𝑚 using
the segmentation process detailed in Section 3.1. We then apply the following cost
function taken from [3, 22] to account for size differences,
cost𝜎(𝑥𝑖, 𝑦𝑗) =
|𝜎(𝑥𝑖)− 𝜎(𝑦𝑗)|
𝜎(𝑥𝑖) + 𝜎(𝑦𝑗)
, (6)
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Table 2: Edit matrix for strings "books" and "broom"
b o o k s
0 1 2 3 4 5
b 1 0 1 2 3 4
r 2 1 1 2 3 4
o 3 2 1 1 2 3
o 4 3 2 1 2 3
m 5 4 3 2 2 3
where 𝜎(𝑥𝑖) is the size of segment 𝑥𝑖 and 𝜎(𝑦𝑗) is the size of segment 𝑦𝑗. The range
of possible values for this cost function is between 0 and 1 inclusive. With respect to
compression ratio differences, we again utilize the following cost function
from [3, 22],
cost𝜖(𝑥𝑖, 𝑦𝑗) =
1
1 + 𝑒−4·|𝜖(𝑥𝑖)−𝜖(𝑦𝑗)|+6.5
− 0.001501, (7)
where 𝜖(𝑥𝑖) and 𝜖(𝑦𝑗) are the compression ratios of the corresponding segments. The
constants, 6.5 and 0.001501, in (7) bound cost𝜖 between 0 and 1 [3]. Combining
equations (6) and (7) results in the final version of the cost function,
cost(𝑥𝑖, 𝑦𝑗) = 𝑐𝜎 · cost𝜎(𝑥𝑖, 𝑦𝑗) + 𝑐𝜖 · cost𝜖(𝑥𝑖, 𝑦𝑗), (8)
where 𝑐𝜎 and 𝑐𝜖 are constants used weight the size and entropy costs appropriately.
Section 4.4.1 defines the values for these constants.
This cost function is then applied to the Levenshtein distance based sequence
alignment algorithm. We use dynamic programming to create a two-dimensional
array similar to Table 2 and retrieve the last element as our final cost calculation
between the two segment sequences. A good reference on dynamic programming can
be found in [9]. In order to utilize equation (5) to calculate the elements of the
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array, we set 𝜏 = 0.3 and define the following functions,
𝛿𝑌 (𝑗) = 𝜏 log 𝜎(𝑦𝑗−1)
𝛿𝑋(𝑖) = 𝜏 log 𝜎(𝑥𝑖−1)
𝛿𝑋,𝑌 (𝑖, 𝑗) = cost(𝑥𝑖−1, 𝑦𝑗−1) · log
(︂
𝜎(𝑥𝑖−1) + 𝜎(𝑦𝑗−1)
2
)︂, (9)
which were derived in [3].
3.2.3 Similarity calculation
After calculating the edit distance using equation (5) with penalty functions
(9), the similarity between files 𝑋 and 𝑌 is determined by applying the following
equation,
similarity = 100
(︂
1− 𝑑𝑛,𝑚
cost𝑚𝑎𝑥
)︂
, (10)
where cost𝑚𝑎𝑥 is the worst-case penalty. As in [3, 22], this penalty is calculated in a
special way and is defined as,
cost𝑚𝑎𝑥 = 𝑑
′
0,𝑚 + 𝑑
′
𝑛,0 (11)
where 𝑑′0,𝑚 and 𝑑′𝑛,0 are determined by using equation (5) with the penalty
functions,
𝛿′𝑌 (𝑗) = 𝛿𝑌 (𝑗)
𝛿′𝑋(𝑖) = 𝛿𝑋(𝑖)
𝛿′𝑋,𝑌 (𝑖, 𝑗) = 2𝜏(log 𝜎(𝑥𝑖−1) + log 𝜎(𝑦𝑗−1)).
(12)
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CHAPTER 4
Experiments and Results Analysis
To evaluate how well the compression-based detection technique described in
this paper fares against metamorphism, we first establish representative data sets
with which to apply our technique to. We then define a common metric to quantify
the technique’s effectiveness and provide our findings. Finally, we provide the
reasoning used to determine the values for the technique’s critical parameters.
4.1 Test Data
4.1.1 Second Generation Virus Generator
In our first set of data, we utilize 50 virus files, which were retrieved from [31],
that were generated by the Second Generation Virus Generator (G2). G2 viruses
are one of several well-known metamorphic families. The benign files we use to
compare against the G2 viruses are 16 specific Cygwin utility files [11] chosen for
their representation as non-virus files in previous papers such as [3, 21, 30]. The
exact files included in the benign data set are shown in Table 3.
Table 3: Cygwin Utility Files Used For Benign Data Set
1 ascii.exe 9 mkshortcut.exe
2 banner.exe 10 msgtool.exe
3 conv.exe 11 putclip.exe
4 cygdrop.exe 12 readshortcut.exe
5 cygstart.exe 13 realpath.exe
6 dump.exe 14 semstat.exe
7 getclip.exe 15 semtool.exe
8 lpr.exe 16 shmtool.exe
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4.1.2 MWOR
In our second set of data, we utilize metamorphic worms that were introduced
in [23]. These worms, also known as MWOR, were designed to defeat statistical
based classifiers, particularly techniques that rely on opcode based analysis such as
the Hidden Markov Model detection technique described in Section 2.2.1. One of
the defining features of the MWOR worm generator is its ability to insert arbitrary
amounts of dead code into the generated malicious files. By copying code from
various benign files and placing it within the MWOR worms in a non-executable
manner, MWOR worms completely retain their functionality while being able to
significantly alter their statistical properties. The amount of dead code inserted into
the worm is denoted and quantified as a padding ratio. A padding ratio of 4, for
example, denotes that in the overall file there is 4 times as much dead code as
actual worm code. We choose 700 MWOR files divided evenly among padding ratios
of 0.5, 1.0, 1.5, 2.0, 2.5, 3.0, and 4.0 in our experiments. Each set of 100 worm
variants containing the same padding ratio are grouped together and tested
separately effectively creating 7 distinct data sets.
For our benign data set, we depart from the Cygwin utility files here since the
MWOR generator produces Linux based worms whereas the Cygwin files are
Windows executables. We instead choose 30 representative standard Linux binaries
shown in Table 4 to better compare against the MWOR worms. The benign data
set and MWOR data set we use here contain the exact same files experimented with
in [3].
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Table 4: Linux Binaries Used For Benign Data Set
1 /bin/date 11 /usr/bin/as 21 /usr/bin/nm
2 /bin/dmesg 12 /usr/bin/at 22 /usr/bin/nm-tool
3 /bin/grep 13 /usr/bin/dig 23 /usr/bin/objdump
4 /bin/kill 14 /usr/bin/file 24 /usr/bin/oclock
5 /bin/mknod 15 /usr/bin/funzip 25 /usr/bin/readelf
6 /bin/mount 16 /usr/bin/killall 26 /usr/bin/rpl8
7 /bin/rm 17 /usr/bin/last 27 /usr/bin/shuf
8 /bin/sleep 18 /usr/bin/ld 28 /usr/bin/size
9 /bin/sync 19 /usr/bin/msgcat 29 /usr/bin/strip
10 /bin/touch 20 /usr/bin/namei 30 /usr/bin/sum
4.1.3 Next Generation Virus Construction Kit
In our final set of data, we utilize 50 virus files generated by the Next
Generation Virus Construction Kit (NGVCK) [31]. NGVCK viruses attempt to
infect Win32 PE-Executables and posses both encryption and anti-debugging
capabilities [32]. Since these viruses target Windows machines, we compare them
against the 16 Cygwin utility files specified in Table 3. NGVCK viruses are
considered highly metamorphic and have been used in previous research such
as [3, 30].
4.2 Receiver Operating Characteristic
To evaluate our results, we choose to use Receiver Operating Characteristic
(ROC) curves. An ROC curve serves as a graphical representation of a binary
classifier system and plots the fraction of true positives against the fraction of false
positives at various thresholds. See Figure 10, which was taken from [27], for an
example plot of superimposed ROC curves. By then calculating the area under the
curve (AUC), we have a single metric by which to compare our results with other
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Figure 10: Example ROC Curve
experiments. If the AUC is near 0.5, it indicates that the evaluated classifier has
poor performance. If the AUC is near 1.0, the classifier is performing very well. An
AUC of exactly 1.0 represents optimal performance.
4.3 Test Results
For each data set, all unique pairs of malicious files and benign files are
compared. Unique pairs of malicious files within the same data set are also
compared. Ideally, comparing a malicious file against a benign file should produce
low similarity while comparing a malicious file against a variant within the same
metamorphic family should produce high similarity.
In our experiments with the G2 viruses, we obtain the results shown in
Figure 11. Here, we use a window size of 128 bytes and a window slide size of 64
bytes. We can see a clear separation between the similarity scores of virus versus
virus and virus versus benign pairs. This indicates that our technique is able to
clearly distinguish between the G2 generated viruses and the benign files.
26
Figure 11: G2 similarity
We then begin testing against the MWOR generated worms, beginning with
those that contain a 0.5 padding ratio, and obtain the results in Figure 12. We use
a window size of 256 bytes and window slide size of 64 bytes. Looking at the results,
we can again set a clear threshold such that there is ideal separation between the
worm versus worm pairs and worm versus benign pairs. Repeating our experiments
with padding ratios 1.0, 1.5, 2.0, 2.5, 3.0, and 4.0, we find that we are able to obtain
full separation at every level. The results for these padding ratios can be found in
Appendix A.
Finally, we experiment with the NGVCK generated viruses and produce the
results in Figure 13. Using a window size of 128 bytes and window slide size of 2
bytes, we again obtain full separation with virus versus virus pairs producing higher
similarity and virus versus benign pairs producing lower similarity. Although our
technique produced no false positives and no false negatives here, the NGVCK
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Figure 12: MWOR(0.5 padding) similarity
generated viruses were by far the most difficult malware to clearly detect in our
experiments. This is likely attributed to the fact that the NGVCK generator
contains encryption capabilities [32]. Code that is obfuscated through encryption
would produce byte distributions that are much less compressible, thus directly
inhibiting our ability to extract information during our segmentation step. However,
it appears that despite these challenges, our compression-based analysis is still able
to identify sufficient unique characteristics of the NGVCK files.
Overall, our compression-based analysis technique is able to fully distinguish
between all sets of metamorphic malware tested and their benign file counterparts.
Ideal separation is achieved in all cases and is illustrated in Figure 14 where ROC
curves are drawn for each set.
We obtain an AUC of 1.0 for all curves. Previous research utilizing structural
entropy analysis also achieved an AUC of 1.0 for the G2 and MWOR generated
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Figure 13: NGVCK similarity
Figure 14: ROC Curve Results
malware [3]. However, they were unable to obtain ideal separation for the NGVCK
case which we have here. Table 5 summarizes our findings.
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Table 5: Results Summary
Metamorphic Family Window Size Window Slide Size AUC
G2 128 64 1.00
NGVCK 128 2 1.00
MWOR(0.5 padding) 256 64 1.00
MWOR(1.0 padding) 256 64 1.00
MWOR(1.5 padding) 256 64 1.00
MWOR(2.0 padding) 256 64 1.00
MWOR(2.5 padding) 256 64 1.00
MWOR(3.0 padding) 256 64 1.00
MWOR(4.0 padding) 256 64 1.00
4.4 Setting Parameters
Although compression-based analysis can identify unique features across
metamorphic malware variants, there are several critical parameters in the
technique that must be correctly calibrated in order to achieve ideal detection.
4.4.1 Cost Constants
Recall cost function (8) that is used during the sequence comparison step
where 𝑐𝜎 and 𝑐𝜖 are adjustable parameters in order to assign appropriate weights to
our two components. In all our experiments, we chose 𝑐𝜎 = 1.6 and 𝑐𝜖 = 0.4.
Previous research [3] has experimentally found these values to be ideal and so we
use these values here as well. Likewise, we set 𝜏 = 0.3 in (9), which is the same
value used for 𝜏 in [3, 22].
4.4.2 Window Slide Size
Another critical parameter is the window slide size. Recall that the window
slide size is the number of bytes we shift, or slide, before analyzing the next window
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Figure 15: Window Slide Size vs. Total Execution Time
in that file. Sensibly, the minimum possible window slide size is 1 byte and the
maximum possible window slide size is the size of the window itself. However, there
is a trade-off. If the window slide size is set too large, too much information is
missed during the calculation of compression ratios and the accuracy of detection
falls. On the other hand, if the window slide size is set too small, a performance
penalty is incurred. The number of windows formed, and hence the number of
compression ratio calculations that must be done (the most expensive part of the
technique), should be minimized while still retaining ideal detection accuracy. In
order to illustrate the window slide size’s effect on performance, we vary the window
slide size while keeping all other parameters constant and plot the resulting
execution times. Figure 15 shows the case where, using our technique, similarity is
calculated between two MWOR variants both with padding ratio 0.5. From this
plot, it can be seen that execution time is inversely proportional to the window slide
size.
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Figure 16: Window Slide Size vs. AUC
In order to illustrate the window slide size’s effect on detection accuracy, we
vary the window slide size used in our technique while keeping all other parameters
constant and plot the resulting AUC. Figure 16 shows the results for the MWOR
case with padding ratio 0.5 where the window slide size is again measured in bytes.
There will always be some oscillation in the AUC due to the structural variation of
the file under analysis. However, we can identify a downward trend in the AUC, and
hence the accuracy of detection, as the window slide size increases. The results have
also been plotted for the NGVCK and can be seen in Figure 17. The decrease in
detection accuracy is more drastic for the NGVCK case. However, for the G2 case,
detection accuracy remains optimal throughout and the results can be seen in
Figure 18. These results are again likely attributed to the fact that G2 is the least
effective metamorphic engine tested in our experiments while NGVCK is the most
effective. We use a window slide size of 2 bytes for the NGVCK malware and a
window slide size of 64 bytes for the G2 and MWOR malware in all other
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Figure 17: Window Slide Size vs. AUC
Figure 18: Window Slide Size vs. AUC
experiments based on the results found here.
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4.4.3 Recursive Iterations of the Wavelet Transform
We observe another parameter that must be carefully set in order to obtain
ideal detection and that is the number of recursive iterations of the wavelet
transform. Recall that the purpose of the transform is to mitigate the effect of high
frequency changes on the segment formation process. Refer to Figure 9 to see an
illustration of this effect. If no transform is applied or too few iterations of the
transform are applied, then the high frequency changes could cause an excess of
segments to be formed which may cause metamorphic malware variants to appear
increasingly dissimilar. However, if too many iterations of the transform are applied,
then we lose too much information from the original compression analysis and all
segment sequences, malicious and benign, begin to look the same. For all our tests,
we found success with setting the number of recursive iterations of the transform to
3. However, other metamorphic families will have to be looked at in a case by case
basis. Appendix B shows the effect of varying wavelet transform iterations for
MWOR with padding ratio 0.5, Appendix C shows the results for NGVCK, and
Appendix D shows the results for G2. For MWOR with padding ratio 0.5 and
NGVCK, we tested up to 5 recursive iterations. However, for G2, we can only test
up to 3 recursive iterations due to the G2 malware having smaller file sizes.
4.4.4 Compression Ratio Threshold
Setting an appropriate compression ratio threshold is also important in the
technique. Recall from Section 3.1.4 that the compression ratio threshold
determines what windows we consider to have high entropy and low entropy. In
order to calibrate this threshold, we experiment with the MWOR malware with
padding ratio 0.5 and vary the threshold while keeping all other parameters
34
Table 6: Compression Ratio Threshold Calibration
Compression Ratio Threshold AUC
0.05 or lower N/A
0.10 0.49154
0.15 0.46793
0.20 0.94633
0.25 0.99985
0.30 0.99952
0.35 0.99358
0.40 0.99992
0.45 0.99999
0.50 0.99934
0.55 0.99814
0.60 1.00000
0.65 1.00000
0.70 1.00000
0.75 1.00000
0.80 1.00000
0.85 or greater N/A
constant. The results are shown in Table 6.
No byte window produced a compression ratio of 0.85 or greater meaning the
files could not be segmented and as a result, no similarity score could be determined
for those cases. Similarly, no byte window produced a compression ratio of 0.05 or
lower. The compression ratio thresholds between 0.60 and 0.80 produced the best
results. The large range of ideal thresholds suggests a somewhat sizable leniency.
We chose to use 0.65 in all other experiments based on this calibration.
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CHAPTER 5
Conclusion and Future Work
We propose the application of compression-based structural analysis to detect
metamorphic malware. We create a binary classification scheme, where we use file
compression ratios to develop representative sequences of each file. These
representative sequences are then compared against each other using the edit
distance algorithm to determine file similarity. After setting a scoring threshold, file
similarity scores can be used to classify files as either benign or malicious.
Despite the many intricate techniques utilized in metamorphic engines, our
experiments indicate that file compression ratios remain a distinguishing feature
across all variants of a given metamorphic malware family. Of all the metamorphic
families we tested, the G2 family were the easiest to detect with all G2 variants
having 99% similarity or higher with each other and low similarity with all tested
benign files. The MWOR metamorphic family displayed higher variability but were
still clearly distinguishable from benign files, even at very high padding ratios. The
NGVCK metamorphic family proved the most difficult to detect, as expected.
Regarded as highly metamorphic and possessing a large array of obfuscation
techniques, the NGVCK malware have been analyzed in a lot of previous research.
However, very few non-emulation based techniques are able to achieve ideal
detection rates.
Overall, we are able to achieve ideal detection, that is, 0% false positives and
0% false negatives, for all metamorphic malware tested. A strength of our technique
is that it is applied directly to binary files without the need for expensive
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pre-processing steps such as code disassembly. Our technique is primarily based on
previous work that utilized structural entropy analysis to detect metamoprhic
malware [3]. Although there are several adjustments made here, the core difference
is that we propose using compression ratios as an alternative measure of entropy.
A possible limitation of the technique, however, is that it is vulnerable to
obfuscation involving heavy use of compression or packing. Since the segmentation
step relies on compression ratio calculations, code that has already been compressed
or packed may render the technique ineffective. However, previous work has shown
that entropy analysis can effectively identify encrypted and packed malware [19].
Therefore, if metamorphic malware use extensive compression or packing for
obfuscation to escape detection by our compression-based analysis, it would only
make them easier to detect using the aforementioned entropy analysis. For future
work, a combination of the two techniques into a single detection framework might
be considered.
Additionally, further experimentation with various parameter settings for the
technique presented in this paper could prove to be useful. Although we are able to
achieve ideal detection, different parameter settings may allow the same level of
detection but with improved efficiency. A more detailed look at using different
compression methods and sequence comparison algorithms may also prove fruitful.
We experimented using Hidden Markov Models as an alternative to the edit
distance algorithm in comparing file sequences. However, we were unable to achieve
the same level of success using that method.
Another path of future work that may prove interesting would be to apply
compression-based analysis to network anomaly detection. It has been shown that
measuring nonextensive entropy is an effective method to detect anomalies in
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network traffic within an Autonomous System [37]. Given the success shown here
using compression ratios as an alternative measure to entropy, it would indicate that
compression-based analysis may also prove similarly effective in other domains
where entropy is a distinguishing feature.
Finally, future work aimed at finding ways to defeat this technique may also
prove worthwhile. For example, the MWOR metamorphic malware make strong use
of dead code insertion, but the dead code is taken from parts of legitimate programs
in order to defeat op-code based similarity detection techniques. If a careful
selection of bytes to manipulate compression ratios are used instead, the MWOR
malware may defeat detection by compression-based analysis as well.
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APPENDIX A
MWOR Results
Figures A.19, A.20, A.21, A.22, A.23, and A.24 show the similarity plots of
the MWOR metamorphic family with varying padding ratios. The set of benign files
used in each experiment shown here can be found in Table 3 of Section 4.1.1.
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Figure A.19: MWOR(1.0 padding) similarity
Figure A.20: MWOR(1.5 padding) similarity
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Figure A.21: MWOR(2.0 padding) similarity
Figure A.22: MWOR(2.5 padding) similarity
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Figure A.23: MWOR(3.0 padding) similarity
Figure A.24: MWOR(4.0 padding) similarity
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APPENDIX B
Wavelet transforms on MWOR (0.5 padding ratio)
The effect of varying wavelet transform iterations for MWOR with padding
ratio 0.5 is plotted in Figures B.25, B.26, B.27, B.28, B.29, and B.30.
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Figure B.25: Wavelet Transform → 0 iterations (MWOR 0.5)
Figure B.26: Wavelet Transform → 1 iteration (MWOR 0.5)
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Figure B.27: Wavelet Transform → 2 iterations (MWOR 0.5)
Figure B.28: Wavelet Transform → 3 iterations (MWOR 0.5)
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Figure B.29: Wavelet Transform → 4 iterations (MWOR 0.5)
Figure B.30: Wavelet Transform → 5 iterations (MWOR 0.5)
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APPENDIX C
Wavelet transforms on NGVCK
The effect of varying wavelet transform iterations for NGVCK is plotted in
Figures C.31, C.32, C.33, C.34, C.35, and C.36.
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Figure C.31: Wavelet Transform → 0 iterations (NGVCK)
Figure C.32: Wavelet Transform → 1 iteration (NGVCK)
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Figure C.33: Wavelet Transform → 2 iterations (NGVCK)
Figure C.34: Wavelet Transform → 3 iterations (NGVCK)
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Figure C.35: Wavelet Transform → 4 iterations (NGVCK)
Figure C.36: Wavelet Transform → 5 iterations (NGVCK)
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APPENDIX D
Wavelet transforms on G2
The effect of varying wavelet transform iterations for G2 is plotted in
Figures D.37, D.38, D.39, and D.40.
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Figure D.37: Wavelet Transform → 0 iterations (G2)
Figure D.38: Wavelet Transform → 1 iteration (G2)
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Figure D.39: Wavelet Transform → 2 iterations (G2)
Figure D.40: Wavelet Transform → 3 iterations (G2)
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